The arrest of the East Kutai Regent Ismunandar and his wife, the Chairperson of the East Kutai DPRD Encek Unguria, emphasized the strong connection between corruption and political dynasties. With executive power held by Ismunandar and legislative power held by Encek, the power is exercised without supervision. It’s indisputable for projects in East Kutai to be handled by partner companies that have provided rewards for Ismunandar and Encek. Ironically, several bribes were allegedly used to finance the Ismunandar campaign in the 2020 elections.
Besides East Kutai, the political dynasties also flourished in different areas. LIPI recorded several dynasties such as the Limpo Dynasty in South Sulawesi, the Narang Dynasty in Central Kalimantan, the Sjahroeddin Dynasty in Lampung, and the Fuad Dynasty in Bangkalan. The most famous regional political dynasty is probably the Chasan Sochib Dynasty (Rau Group) in Banten. Political patronage in the form of kinship also occurs in the DPR. A report from Formappi stated that 48 members of the DPR legislative period 2019-2024 contained certain kinship connections at the level of the political elite.
The flourishing of political dynasties – especially in the regions – is inseparable from the political parties’ role and regulations concerning the elections. Oligarchies in the body of political parties cause the mechanism of candidacy and nomination not through democratic mechanisms by considering the ability and integrity of the candidates. This circumstance is due to the pragmatic political market today: whoever has big money and has descendants of influential people, they are more likely to get a higher political electability level.
Even though the role of political parties is vital in improving the nomination mechanism in the elections, such as by developing a candidate selection mechanism that is tighter, more transparent, and involves the public. Political parties are required to hold an extensive selection, public testing, and even preliminary elections before finally determining candidates’ determination. Thus, selected candidates will have definite capacity, not people who are chosen solely because they have a kinship line with the ruling or elite political parties.
Other than political parties, the Constitutional Court (MK) in 2015, which canceled Article 7 Letter r of Law Number 8 of 2015 concerning Regional Election, also became a separate predicament. Whereas before, the article required a period of one or five years for those who were bound by kinship with incumbents to be able to advance in the elections. The absence of the gap in the candidacy of relatives is used to encourage family members who cannot lead the region and only become a means of connecting power.
However, expecting genuine intentions to come from political parties is undoubtedly quite tricky. Instead of conduct internal reforms, political parties appear to enjoy the legal vacuum by strengthening its political patronage. Therefore, pressure from external institutions is necessitated. Besides expecting MK to re-open the testing room for the nomination rules in the elections in a way to hold dynastic politics, more serious prevention strategies in the political sector.
First, the KPK needs to partner with the Ministry of Home Affairs to push for political party reform other than imposing penalties for corruptors who have a political background by encouraging the revocation of political rights. There have been many studies and recommendations that can be done by the Ministry of Home Affairs to increase transparency and accountability of political parties along with policies to increase financial aid for political parties. The Ministry of Home Affairs has the authority to ask Political Parties to open an account for their finances to the public with incentives to increase financial assistance.
It is essential since the stagnation in the Indonesia Corruption Perceptions Index’s trends is reflected by the failure to fix the political sector. The Study on the Integrity of Political Party Systems (SIPP), which has been launched by the KPK and LIPI since 2018, needs to be upheld comprehensively, notably encouraging more transparent and accountable political party funding and promoting reforms in the political system of candidacy and recruitment based on the merit system.
Second, the National Corruption Prevention Team should not tend to avoid the problems of political corruption. The team needs to include specific corruption prevention actions in the political sector. In contrast, corruption in this sector is the root of corruption in many new democracies countries such as Indonesia, where influence is the primary trading tool. Improvements in the economic and business sectors may seem to contribute to positive results, but it will be challenging if not followed by massive eradication of corruption in the political area.
In the end, the reluctance to fix the political sector will only lead to a dead-end for eradicating corruption in the long run. Strong political leadership is needed to ensure patronage in the political-economic sector stops co-opting public rights, encouraging political parties to implement checks and balances mechanisms, and preventing corruption in legislation, particularly for the Electoral and Political Party.
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